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It is undeniable that our nation is in the midst of a fitness paradox: our
national preoccupation of achieving "the elusive American ideal-to be
slim, fit, and forever young"' exists incongruently with a nationwide
obesity epidemic. According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, more than one-third of adults in the United States are
considered "obese."2 The increasing prevalence of obesity, as well as the
resulting health problems (such as diabetes, hypertension, heart disease,
etc.), has led both local and state governments to take action against
America's expanding waistline. However, instead of creating a
comprehensive solution to the problem, these governments are attacking
the easiest scapegoat available: the fast food industry. State legislatures
have ridden in like a white knight, fashioning legislation to protect the
masses from their own food choices. One popular approach is the creation
of laws mandating nutritional disclosure on restaurant menus. Such laws
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attempt to halt the obesity epidemic in its tracks by forcing restaurants to
display the calorie content and other nutritional information on their menus
and on menu boards. Within the past year, fourteen states and three major
cities have introduced legislation requiring nutritional disclosure in
restaurants.3
Considering that Americans spend nearly half their food budgets on
foods prepared outside their homes and consume about one-third of daily
calories from outside sources-"much of it from fast food"-it is rational
that many of these regulations target the fast food industry.4 However,
even the most well-intentioned regulations should be subject to boundaries.
The government should not be allowed to coerce private speakers to take
financial and commercial responsibility for the ideas it chooses to
promote.5 Additionally, it is important to note that academics have
conflicting views regarding this catastrophic advent of obesity. Studies
asserting a connection between obesity and mortality often fail to take into
consideration "confounding variables" such as sedentary lifestyle and low
6economic status. The information procured from such research is far from
conclusive. One study in the New England Journal of Medicine concluded
that data linking obesity and death, as well as the data showing the
beneficial effects of weight loss, are "limited, fragmentary, and often
ambiguous.",7  The authors went on to note that the causes and
consequences of obesity are "not a matter of settled and undisputed truth"
and that "in light of that uncertainty, we should be very skeptical of any
effort to solve this matter by governmental intervention.. .. "8
Although well intentioned, legislation requiring nutritional disclosure
on restaurant menus and menu boards violates the constitutional right to
freedom of speech. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects "both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
3. States proposing such legislation include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee and Vermont. Cities include Chicago, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. Brief for
City and Council of San Francisco et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, N.Y. State
Restaurants Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 07 Civ.
05710).
4. Lisa R. Young & Marion Nestle, Portion Sizes and Obesity: Responses of Fast-Food
Companies, 28 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 238, 239 (2007).
5. Christine Esperanza, Note, Fruits, Nuts, Cigarettes, and the Right to Remain Silent, 31
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 163, 178 (2003).
6. Kassirer & Angell, supra note 1, at 52.
7. Id.
8. Richard A. Epstein, Obesity Policy Choices: What (7ot) to Do About Obesity: A
Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1366 (2005).
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speaking at all." 9 Forcing mandatory disclosure of nutritional information
on restaurant menus and menu boards is a noble idea; however, it is not
directly related to the state's interest and is far broader than what is
necessary to accomplish the state's purpose of decreasing obesity rates.
California's reintroduction of nutrition disclosure legislation is not only
vulnerable to being vetoed again by Governor Schwarzenegger; it is also
vulnerable to also being struck down as unconstitutional under the freedom
of speech standards promulgated by the California Constitution and the
California courts.
This note examines the constitutionality of legislation requiring
mandatory nutritional disclosure on restaurant menus and menu boards
under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee. Part I
examines the history of nutritional disclosure. Part II analyzes the
intersection of nutritional disclosure and freedom of commercial speech.
Part III concludes that such regulation is unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.
I. The History of Nutritional Disclosure and Governmental
Attempts to Control Obesity
A. The History of Federal Legislation Regarding Nutritional Disclosure
For seventy years, the federal government has controlled the activities
of food producers through the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FD&C
Act"). As originally enacted, the FD&C Act was intended to give the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") authority to police the "adulteration"
and "misbranding" of food.' 0 Since its inception, the FD&C Act has been
amended more than 100 times, usually to broaden the Act's jurisdiction.''
For instance, the FDA broadened the Act's jurisdiction in 1941 by setting
forth regulations requiring nutritional disclosure.12  However, these
regulations only mandated limited disclosure when a claim was made about
a particular nutrient. 13 Also, in 1973, the FDA introduced nutrition labeling
requirements with a uniform format for food. 14  These amendments
9. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citing Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943)).
10. PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 13 (3d ed.
2007).
11. Id. at 14.
12. PETER BARTON HUTT, A Brief History of FDA Regulation Relating to the Nutrient
Content of Food, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 204 (3d ed. 2007).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 205.
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introduced nutrition labels as we know them, requiring nutrition labels for
specific nutrients in a standardized format, minimum type size, and
uniform placement in order to provide consumers with easy-to-understand
information in a ready fashion.15  However, these labels were not
mandatory. Labels were only required for foods with either added nutrients
or which made claims about nutrient content.16 In 1990, Congress passed
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act ("NLEA"). 17 NLEA gave the
FDA authority to require nutritional labeling on all foods.' 8 NLEA was the
first statute introducing nutritional labels as they currently exist, requiring
food manufacturers to state the total number of calories, calories from fat,
total fat, cholesterol, sodium, carbohydrates, and sugars in a specified
portion size. 19 By requiring national uniformity through federal legislation,
the NLEA "effectively removed state and local government from
establishing regulatory requirements relating to the nutrient content of
food. '' 20  NLEA prohibits states from enacting similar food labeling
requirements when they are not identical to the FDA requirements.2 '
Congress exempted restaurant menus from the standards, the
requirements, and the health claims provisions of NLEA due to the heavy
burden nutritional disclosure requirements would place on restaurants
given the dynamic nature of their menus.22 However, after a lawsuit
declared such a broad exemption unlawful, the FDA limited restaurants'
freedom by mandating disclosure requirements for restaurant food items
which made health or nutrient claims. 23 Nutritional information for such
foods must be provided by the restaurant upon request.24 Some leading
scholars propose that the FDA purposefully left the power to regulate
restaurant nutrition labeling to the states. Professor Hutt, for example,
concludes that because foods consumed in restaurants are exempt from the




18. HUTr, supra note 12.
19. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353-
56 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1)(C)-(D) (2000)).
20. HURr, supra note 12.
21. HUT ET AL., supra note 10, at 1452-53.
22. Food Labeling: General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 21 C.F.R. §§ 20, 101
(1993).
23. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Shalala, 932 F. Supp. 13, 18 (D.D.C. 1996).
24. Food Labeling: Nutrition Labeling of Restaurant Foods, 21 C.F.R. § 101.10 (1996).
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local requirements governing foods in restaurants are not subject to
25preemption.
B. The History of Obesity in America
Many commentators assert that obesity is a recent development.
However, as early as the 1950s, the American Heart Association had
identified obesity as a cardiac risk factor, to be prevented through diet and
exercise.26 In 1969, the White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and
Health recommended increasing activity levels of what was already a
sedentary nation.27 Obesity prevention has been an express goal of national
health policies since the 1980s, implemented through the promotion of
nutrition education programs, increased physical fitness, and research on
obesity prevention.28 However, these programs proved to be all talk and
little action, as physical education in schools, diet and exercise by
overweight people, and counseling on obesity by physicians have all
declined.29
Notably, prior attempts by the federal government to control obesity
through mandated nutritional disclosure have failed to pass in Congress. In
2004 and 2006, federal legislation was introduced which would have
mandated restaurant disclosure of nutritional information, but neither bill
passed.3 ° States and local governments have also attempted to step in to
prevent obesity, with similar results. In early 2008, Mississippi legislators
proposed a bill which would force restaurants to deny service to obese
customers. 31  The bill died in committee, and the Chairman of the
Mississippi House Public Health and Human Services Committee
acknowledged the irrationality of such a policy, noting the "oppressi[on]"
25. See HurT ET AL., supra note 10, at 1454. This topic is discussed more fully infra Part II.
26. Marion Nestle & Michael F. Jacobson, Halting the Obesity Epidemic: A Public Health
Policy Approach, 115 PUB. HEALTH REP. 12, 14 (2000).
27. Id. at 14-15.
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id. at 16.
30. See Menu Education and Labeling Act, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2004); Menu Education
and Labeling Act, H.R. 5563, 109th Cong. (2006).
31. The proposed legislation would have prohibited food establishments from serving food
to any person determined to be "obese," as defined through criteria to be created by the State
Department of Health. The State Department of Health would also have power to revoke the
permits of restaurants failing to comply with these mandates. The legislation died in committee
in early February 2008. See H.B. 282, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008), available at
http://billstatus.Is.state.ms.us/documents/2008/html/HB/0200-0299/HB0282fN.htm, for the text
of this proposed legislation.
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implicit in a government requiring a restaurant owner to "police another
human being from their own indiscretions. ' 32
II. The Intersection of Nutritional Disclosure and Freedom of
Commercial Speech
In 2007, New York City attempted to combat city-wide obesity by
implementing a regulation requiring restaurants to post nutritional
information on their menu boards and menus.33 The regulations were
limited to restaurants with more than fifteen sites which already disclosed
calorie counts in some way. 34 The local restaurant industry appealed the
regulation, arguing that the regulation was a narrow-sighted, questionably
effective, and overly expensive means of promoting public health.35 More
importantly, it claimed that such a regulation was preempted by NLEA and
therefore not within state jurisdiction.36 In New York State Restaurants
Ass 'n v. New York City Board of Health, a federal district court agreed that
the mandated nutrition disclosure requirements were preempted by
NLEA.37 Because the regulations were only imposed on restaurants that
already voluntarily disclosed the nutritional content of their food, the
district court held NLEA, which regulates voluntary nutritional disclosures,
preempted the regulations.38 Nevertheless, the district court provided a
blueprint for how to rewrite the legislation to avoid preemption. 39 The
court remarked that where there is no "voluntary" aspect and the
regulations impose a blanket mandatory duty on all restaurants meeting a
standard definition such as operating ten or more restaurants under the
same name, state nutritional disclosure regulations would not be preempted
by NLEA.40  Notably, the court refrained from discussing the First
Amendment issues at hand.4' The court stated that because the legislation
32. Id.
33. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 352 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
34. Diane Cardwell, City Tries Again to Require Restaurants to Post Calories, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2008, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/nyregion/23menu.htmlr-
I &scp=city%20again%20&st-cse&oref slogin.
35. N.Y. State Rest. Ass 'n, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 363.
38. Id. at 353; Joseph Goldstein, Court Rebuffs Mayor's Plan on Fast Food, N.Y. SUN, Sept.
12, 2007, http://www.nysun.com/article/62411 (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
39. Goldstein, supra note 38.
40. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass 'n, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
41. Id.
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was preempted by NLEA,42 there was no need to address the First
Amendment issues.43
The New York City Board of Health amended and reintroduced the
regulation in January 2008.4 4 The new regulation required restaurants with
more than fifteen sites nationwide to display the calorie content of foods
and beverages on their menus and menu boards.45 The Board claimed to
have altered the previous regulation by strictly following the
recommendation made by the district court46 and acknowledged that
information is already extensively made available to customers.47 It also
insisted that despite the plethora of information provided by restaurants on
the Internet, tray liners, napkins, and brochures, customers rarely see such
information when ordering food.4 8 New York City Health Commissioner,
Dr. Thomas R. Frieden, stated that requiring restaurants to post calorie
content on their menus and menu boards will "help New Yorkers make
healthier choices about what to eat; living longer, healthier lives as a
result. 4 9 The Board further projected that the regulations could prevent
150,000 people from developing obesity over the next five years.50 On
January 31, 2008, the New York Restaurant Association filed a lawsuit
challenging the regulation, which it claimed was almost identical to the
regulation struck down in 2007.51
42. By its terms, NLEA does not preempt requirements of nutrition labeling. However, it
does preempt and prohibit requirements of labeling which are not identical to requirements
already in the NLEA. Mandating disclosure for restaurants that already provided nutrition
information, but not for restaurants which did not provide such information violated NLEA
because it created a standard different from that already promulgated in NLEA. N. Y State Rest.
Ass'n, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
43. Id. at 353.
44. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31451, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008) [hereinafter New York I1], stay denied pending appeal, 545 F. Supp. 2d
363 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
45. Press Release, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Board of
Health Votes to Require Chain Restaurants to Display Calorie Information in New York City
(Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/pr2008/pr008-08.shtml.
46. See Cardwell, supra note 34.





51. Stephanie Saul, Conflict on the Menu, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2008, at Cl, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/16business/16obese.html?scp=l&sq=Conflict%20on%2the%
20Menu&st=cse.
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In April 2008, the district court reheard New York State Restaurants
Ass 'n v. New York City Board of Health ("New York I/,), 52 but this time
upheld the regulation.53 The court found that because the new regulation
was mandatory for all restaurants, it was not preempted by NLEA1 4 The
court stated that the constitutionality of the regulation should be analyzed
under the Zauderer standard, requiring only that the regulations be
"reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of
consumers." 55 The court declared that concerns of the regulation violating
freedom of speech were negligible.5 6 It stated that plaintiffs could not
claim that they were being compelled to speak based on the fact that
nutritional information is "purely factual and uncontroversial" information,
regardless of the motive behind passing the legislation. 7 Furthermore, the
court concluded that the regulation was related to the state's interest in
"providing consumers with more complete nutrient information concerning
restaurant offerings., 58 It relied on "common sense" to conclude that if
"'some" consumers saw the caloric information and then chose less caloric
food, this would ultimately lead to a lower incidence of obesity.59
The court's reliance on the Zauderer standard 60 was misplaced. The
court's refusal to acknowledge the unavoidable inconsistency of nutritional
disclosure at restaurants led it to incorrectly conclude that nutrition labeling
is purely factual and uncontroversial. Restaurant food is not like packaged
food. Packaged foods with traditional nutrition labels are generally made
in mass quantities, with methods ensuring consistency in volume,
ingredients, and size. However, even identical restaurant meals can vary
greatly from cook to cook, based on inescapable factors such as preparation
discrepancies. For that reason, the nutritional content of restaurant items is
not inherently "factual and uncontroversial" and should not be labeled as
such by the court.
The mandatory nutritional disclosure should not have been deemed
constitutional even under the more lenient standard applied by the court.
The court's attenuated logic blindly assumed that knowing caloric
52. New York 11, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31451.
53. Id. at *3.
54. Id. at*19.
55. Id. at *26-27 (citing Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114-15 (2d Cir.
2001)).
56. Id. at *29.
57. Id.
58. Id. at*35.
59. Id. at *47.
60. Id. See also Nat'l Elec. Mfrs., 272 F.3d at 115 (using Zauderer standard rather than
stricter Central Hudson test for commercial regulation).
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information at restaurants will lead to lower obesity rates. The court
ignored the fact that even though individuals consume one-third of calories
outside the home,61 two-thirds of calories are consumed at home and are
not broadcast on a menu board. Proponents may argue that calculating the
household consumption of calories is available due to easy access on
nutrition labels. But, with the frequent mixing of different ingredients to
create a meal, does the average person actually know how many calories
are in the dinner they sit down to eat each night?
The New York City Board of Health is not the only group of
lawmakers trying to pass nutritional disclosure legislation. The State of
California has also attempted to require nutritional disclosure on its
restaurant menus. In 2007, the California State Senate passed Senate Bill
120 that would have forced restaurants to list the total calories, total fat,
trans fat, sodium, and carbohydrate content next to each food item on their
menus. 62 The bill also would have required fast-food restaurants to include
total number of calories next to food items on menu boards, and was
widely supported throughout the state.63 Nonetheless, it was vetoed in
October 2007 by Governor Schwarzenegger, who called the regulation
inflexible and unfairly burdensome upon the restaurant industry.64 Nearly
identical regulations were re-introduced in 2008.65 And one week later, the
County of San Francisco's Board of Supervisors initiated a similar
ordinance.66
III. Nutritional Regulations are Unconstitutional Violations of
the First Amendment Freedom of Speech
Even if nutritional disclosure regulations are not vetoed or struck
down for other reasons, they are not likely to survive constitutional
critique. Requiring restaurants to broadcast the nutritional content of the
61. New York 11, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31451, at *5.
62. S.B. 120, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/sen/sb_0101-0150/sb_120_bill_20070122_introduced.html.
63. Polls showed that 84 percent of registered voters favored mandatory nutritional labeling.
The bill was also supported by major health, consumer, senior, and labor organizations across
California. Dr. Harold Goldstein & Lupe Alonzo-Diaz, Editorial, S.B. 120: Healthy Step toward
a Slimmer State, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 10, 2007, at B7, available at
http://www.sacbee.com/l 10/story/423634.html.
64. S.B. 120, 2007 Reg. Sess. at I (Cal. 2007) (Governor Schwarzenegger's veto message),
available at http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/SB%20120%20veto%20message.pdf.
65. S.B. 1420, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1420_bill20080221_introduced.html.
66. Wyatt Buchanan, S.F. Expected Pass Law on Nutrition Disclosure, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Feb. 29, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2008/
02/29/MNR9VASHU.DTL.
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food they serve is akin to forcing speech, and such action violates their
First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Although the court in New
York II approved such legislation, the decision was based on an
inappropriate standard, and, therefore, should not be followed by other
courts that consider such regulations. Rather, the threshold issue, which
New York II declined to consider, is the infringement the regulations
impose on the First Amendment right to commercial speech.
Under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the
government "can make no law abridging the freedom of speech., 67 The
First Amendment protects commercial speech as well as private speech.68
Speech does not lose its protected status merely because it is done for
profit.69 As applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
First Amendment provides protection for commercial speech against
unwarranted governmental regulation.7 °  Government regulation of
commercial speech is "not intended to be narrowly limited to mere
proposal of a particular commercial transaction," but also to include "false
claims as to the harmlessness of the advertiser's product asserted for the
purpose of persuading members of the reading public to buy the product. 71
State laws can require commercial speech to appear in such a form or to
include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers "as are
necessary to prevent its being deceptive., 72 Accordingly, speech which is
false or misleading is not entitled to First Amendment protection.However,
businesses have a right to withhold information that is not false or
misleading. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, the United States Supreme Court set forth an intermediate
scrutiny standard with a four-prong test to determine whether or not
regulations on commercial speech violate the First Amendment. 73  The
Court specifically noted that "regulations that entirely suppress commercial
speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy" should be reviewed
with particular consideration.74
Applying the Central Hudson test, courts have found that where a
state's interests are not substantial enough to justify a regulation, state
67. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68. See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976).
69. See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 868 (1979).
70. See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-62.
71. Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 570 F.2d 157, 163 (7th Cir.
1977).
72. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
73. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
74. Id.
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mandates requiring certain statements or disclosures violate the
Constitution.75 Additionally, when a governmental body seeks to sustain a
restriction on commercial speech it must demonstrate that the harms the
speech recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree.76
Certain courts have claimed that these regulations are compelled
commercial speech that should be governed by more lenient standards."
Such courts justify using the deferential standard by claiming that where
there is a substantial state interest and not just consumer curiosity,
deference to legislatures may be required.78  Additionally, they
acknowledge that "[r]equiring actors in the marketplace to espouse
particular opinions" would likely be considered under a different
standard.79  Mandating nutritional disclosure requires restaurants to
advocate not only the opinion that the United States is in an obesity
epidemic, but also that eating fast food necessarily leads to obesity.
Accordingly, such disclosures should be analyzed under the Central
Hudson framework.8°
The Central Hudson test has been widely criticized as creating an
untenable dichotomy which leads to uncertainty and places too much
discretion in the hands of judges.8' However, Central Hudson remains the
leading rubric for analyzing the constitutionality of compelled commercial
speech.
A. NLEA-Mandated Food Labeling is Constitutional
Unlike the proposed nutritional disclosure regulations, the current
nutritional labeling on packaged food imposed by NLEA is not
unconstitutional. It is debatable whether the NLEA labels should be
considered "speech." The court in New York Restaurants Ass 'n explained
that statements regarding the nutritional content of foods, such as the
proposed calorie requirements, should be viewed differently than the
75. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
76. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).
77. See Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
78. Id. at 115 n.6.
79. Id. at 114 n.5.
80. California, one of the leading proponents of such legislation, utilizes the Central Hudson
analysis in determining violations of freedom of commercial speech. See, e.g., In re Tobacco
Cases II, 41 Cal. 4th 1257, 1274 (2007); Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura, 33 Cal. 4th 1, 22
(2004) People ex rel. Brown v. PuriTec, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1537 (3d. Dist 2007).
Accordingly, analyzing the legislation under such the stricter Central Hudson standard provides
the most effective analysis of determining whether such speech will be deemed constitutional.
81. See, e.g., Aaron A. Goach, Free Speech and Freer Speech, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
623, 637 (1998).
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existing NLEA claims. 82 Although the proposed disclosures were "claims"
under the NLEA, the court expressly noted that the mandatory statement of
nutrient amount in the familiar Nutrition Facts panel is not a "claim., 83 It
could be argued that the NLEA labels should be considered compelled
commercial speech under Glickman v. Wileman Brothers.84 Under this
standard, any regulation would be held to a higher level of scrutiny. But
because of their broader purpose and limited scope, NLEA labels are
constitutional under the Central Hudson test, even if they constitute
compelled commercial speech.
First, the NLEA-imposed labeling is based on a legitimate, substantial
governmental interest of promoting general health by educating consumers
about nutritional content of foods.85 The FDA has a recognized, substantial
interest in protecting and promoting public health.86 Although the new
proposed menu disclosures may claim to ultimately have the same broad
goal, their expressly stated interest is what they must be judged by.
Second, unlike the menu disclosure regulations, the NLEA
requirements are the least invasive means of achieving their purported goal.
It would be nearly impossible for individuals to determine the calories or
grams of sodium in a box of crackers without the NLEA label on the side.
Most companies which sell food in grocery stores do not list their nutrition
facts elsewhere, and it is unlikely that people would be able to find such
information on their own. It would be absurd to suggest that grocery stores
maintain an accessible database containing nutritional information for all of
their products. The means employed by the NLEA label is the least
invasive means possible to achieve public health interest.
The proposed menu disclosures, however, stand in stark contrast to the
NLEA labels. The nutrition disclosures proposed for restaurant menus are
based on overly narrow concerns such as the "war against obesity" and
obesity costs imposed on local governments, interests which are not
sufficiently defined.87 Moreover, the information found on the proposed
82. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 360 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
83. Seeid.at361.
84. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). The compelled speech
argument would be that the NLEA-imposed labeling prevents food manufacturers from
communicating any other message because it limits available space on products to advertise.
However, it is questionable whether the NLEA labels are promoting political ideology.
Mandatory menu nutritional disclosure does, however, constitute compelled commercial speech.
See infra Part III.B.
85. Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and
Health Claims, 21 C.F.R. § 101 (2003).
86. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
87. N.Y. State Rest. Ass 'n, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
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menu disclosures is generally available to the public, mooting any least
invasive means argument. Most chains offer information on pamphlets or
posters located in the store. Many chains have the information available
online. The National Restaurant Association collaborated with the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention to create a website offering consumers
free listings of the nutritional information for local restaurants. 88 There are
also many privately managed internet sites dedicated to promoting public
health such as shapefit.com, 89 chowbaby.com, 90 and calorieking.com 91 that
provide nutritional information for foods served at many fast food and sit-
down restaurants. The nutritional information for most restaurant food
items is already available to the public.92 While the NLEA labels are
undoubtedly necessary in order to serve their purpose, the proposed
restaurant disclosures are overly broad. The NLEA labels are therefore
constitutional, while the newly proposed disclosures are not.
B. Mandatory Nutritional Disclosure on Restaurant Labels is Compelled
Speech
Proponents of nutritional disclosure laws may try to claim that such
laws are closer to constitutionally approved economic regulations than
unconstitutional compelled speech. Compelled commercial speech has
been analyzed most recently in two Supreme Court cases: Glickman v.
Wileman Brothers93 and United States v. United Foods.94  Because
Glickman is the stricter of the two standards, analysis of the nutrition
disclosure under that scheme illustrates that even under the most stringent
requirements, nutrition disclosure is commercial speech.
In Glickman, fruit growers, handlers, and processors brought a First
Amendment compelled speech claim after they were required to contribute
88. On the website, consumers enter in a city and price range for dining and are directed to a
list of local restaurants with links to the nutrition content of their menu items. See Healthy
Dining Program, http://www.healthydiningfinder.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
89. Shapefit Fast Food Calories, http://www.shapefit.com/fastfood.html (last visited Sept.
27, 2008).
90. Chowbaby Fast Food Calories and Calorie Counter,
http://www.chowbaby.com/fastfood/fast-food-nutrition.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
91. CalorieKing Fast Food Chains and Restaurants Food Database,
http://www.calorieking.com/foods/calories-in-fast-food-chains-restaurantsc-
Y2lkPTIxJnBhcj0.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
92. Although the websites and pamphlets cited supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text
are mostly limited to chain restaurants, the proposed menu regulations would mostly affect these
types of establishments. This is because the proposed regulations generally require restaurant
chains with at least ten or fifteen locations to disclose information.
93. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
94. United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
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to generic advertising expenses for fruit from their state.95 The Supreme
Court denied the growers' claim, stating that the assessments levied to pay
for a collective general advertising campaign were economic regulations
that did not fall under First Amendment protection.96 The Court found
three factors which distinguished Glickman regulations from past
commercial speech claims.97 First, the regulations did not prevent the fruit
producers from communicating their own message. 98  Second, the
regulations did not compel any person to engage in actual or symbolic
speech.99 Finally, the regulations did not compel producers to finance
political or ideological speech.'00 Because of these factors, the Court held
that the regulations should be considered economic regulations rather than
compelled speech. '01
Mandatory nutritional disclosure requirements on menus should be
considered commercial speech and can be easily distinguished from the
economic regulations in Glickman. First, the required nutritional disclosure
prevents a restaurant owner from communicating her own message. The
proposed California-legislation requires nutritional information, including
calories, total fat, trans fat, sodium, and carbohydrate content, that would
take up substantial space on menu boards and menus. Even the less
invasive New York legislation, which only requires the caloric content of
food, still results in a loss of valuable advertising space on menus and
menu boards. By occupying space on menus, this information prevents
restaurant owners from conveying other messages on the menus, such as
advertisements or promotions.
Second, nutritional disclosure regulations can clearly be seen as
compelling actual or symbolic speech. In Glickman, the regulation was not
considered compelled speech because it required only financial
contributions. 0 2 Conversely, mandated nutritional disclosures force actual
speech. They require actual writing to be placed on menus and menu
boards and force restaurants to financially sponsor and communicate
government-mandated messages to consumers. The restaurants are not
forced to simply contribute money to an anti-obesity advertising campaign;
they are forced to present in-depth information at their own cost.
95. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 460.
96. Id. at 474.
97. Id. at 469-70.
98. Id. at 469.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 469-70.
101. Id. at 470-71.
102. Id. at 471.
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Finally, mandatory nutritional disclosure laws force restaurants to
finance political or ideological speech that is clearly against their interests
and beliefs. The financial contributions at issue in Glickman were used to
further the interests of fruit growers as a group.'0 3 Here, forcing restaurants
to pay large sums to alter their menus and menu boards completely in order
to include nutritional information requires restaurants to take action
contrary to their own interests and beliefs. Obesity has recently evolved
from a private matter into a political issue. 10 4 It has been said that "the
obesity epidemic is a myth manufactured by public health officials in
concert with assorted academics and special-interest lobbyists.", 0
5
Researchers have warned of such policies, referring to them as the "tyranny
of health," where people who veer from what is considered the ideal
specimen are presumed to have acted in a way meriting punishment.10 6
Offenders would be subjected to laws forcing conformity to "healthy
behavior" under the guise that it is for the individual's own good as well as
for the public good. 10 7 Providing nutritional information in the hopes that
consumers will have dietary epiphanies before ordering is undoubtedly
catering to a political health agenda. Because mandatory nutritional
disclosure prevents restaurants from displaying their own messages and
forces restaurants to promote politically-motivated speech against their
interest, such disclosures undeniably fall within commercial speech.
C. Mandatory Nutritional Disclosure Violates the Freedom of
Commercial Speech Under the Central Hudson Test
The constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech is gauged
under the four-part test introduced in Central Hudson.'08  Although the
New York II court analyzed the regulation under the more lenient Sorrell
standard,10 9 this standard has not been universally approved for use in such
situations'' 0 and is not likely to be given such unquestioned deference in
other jurisdictions.
103. Id. at 475.
104. See Rogan Kersh & James A. Morone, Obesity, Courts, and the New Politics of Public
Health, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 839 (2005).
105. Patrick Basham & John Luik, Four Big, Fat Myths, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 27,
2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/11/26/nfat26.xml (last
visited Sept. 27, 2008).
106. Faith T. Fitzgerald, The Tyranny of Health, 331 NEwENG. J. MED. 196, 196 (1994).
107. Id.
108. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
109. New York 11, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31451, at *26.
110. Sorrell was a Second Circuit case Nati. Elect. Mfrs. Assn. v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113
(2d Cir. 2001). In a similar commercial speech case, the Seventh Circuit held that a regulation
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The First Amendment interest in commercial speech includes both the
interests of the speaker and the speaker's prospective audience:
consumers."' The speaker's interest includes conveying a chosen message
to potential consumers. The consumer's interest consists of gaining
information on which to base the decision of whether to purchase the
product and is served by insuring that the information proffered by the
speaker is not false or deceptive." 2 The first prong of the Central Hudson
test addresses this concern and protects the interest of the audience. 13 The
prong provides that in order for speech to be potentially protected by the
First Amendment, it must be lawful and not misleading." 4 Both the states
and the federal government may act to restrict the dissemination of speech
which is determined to be "false, deceptive or misleading."
'" 5
Menus and menu boards are lawful representations of the goods sold
at restaurants. It could be claimed that the names or descriptions of food
items on menus have the potential to be misleading as to the nutritional
value or actual ingredients or content of the item. Proponents of the
disclosures may claim that using the words "veggie patty" is deceiving
because there is no indication whether the patty is made entirely from
vegetables. And consumers may unknowingly assume that the item is
healthy because the word "veggie" is in its title. However, not including
specific information about the contents of a veggie patty is more likely to
be seen as an omission of comment about nutritional properties rather than
misrepresentation. As long as restaurants do not expressly claim that the
veggie patty is healthy, they do not mislead the consumer. Menus would
become novels if restaurants were forced to list every single ingredient of
an entree. Courts have warned against the slippery slope dangers of similar
disclosure requirements.11 6 If governments could elicit disclosure for such
arbitrary consumer concerns, there is no end to the types of disclosures that
could be mandated. Because menu boards are not inherently misleading, it
is doubtful that this health argument would be enough to substantiate a
requiring labeling of a "subjective and highly controversial nature" was unconstitutional. Entm't
Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006).




114. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
115. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979).
116. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2nd Cir. 1996).
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claim that menus were misleading enough to negate protection under the
First Amendment.' 
17
The second prong of the Central Hudson test examines whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. 1 8  Under this prong, the
government not only has an obligation to identify the interest it is pursuing,
but must also prove that such an interest is significant. Protection of the
health, safety, and welfare of citizens has been acknowledged to be a
substantial governmental interest under the Central Hudson analysis.' 19 In
New York Restaurants Ass'n, the asserted governmental interest was
battling the "obesity epidemic" plaguing New York by causing health
problems and generating enormous financial costs to society. 2° The
government will have to prove that this regulation is in the interest of
public health and does not just appease consumer interest or lower costs to
the city.
Courts have previously rejected states' attempts to compel disclosure
where the state interest was merely to satisfy consumer curiosity. In
International Dairy Food Ass'n v. Amestoy, the Vermont legislature
enacted a statute requiring disclosure on dairy products from cows that had
been treated with specific supplemental growth hormones. 21  The
International Dairy Food Association, the major trade association of the
dairy industry, filed suit in response to the regulation, claiming that the
regulation compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment.,2 2 The
court held that Vermont failed the second prong of the Central Hudson test
by failing to state a substantial governmental interest.1 23 The court declared
that consumer interest and right to know were inadequate governmental
purposes and could not justify interfering with businesses' First
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech. 24  The court
commented that if it held consumer interest alone was sufficient "there
[would be] no end to the information that states could require
117. Rebecca S. Fribush, Putting Calorie and Fat Counts on the Table: Should Mandatory
Nutritional Disclosure Laws Apply to Restaurant Foods?, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 377, 388
(2005).
118. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
119. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1995) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
120. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
121. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69-70 (2nd Cir. 1996).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 73.
124. Id.
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,125manufacturers to disclose about their production methods." However,
the court also recognized that an indication that such "information bears on
a reasonable concern for human health or safety" could justify compelled
disclosure by manufacturers. 
126
Accordingly, the public's interest in nutrition or supposed right to
know the calories of the food it is purchasing cannot be used as the
governmental purpose behind the disclosure regulations. But, since it will
likely be easy for the government to prove that nutritional information
bears relation to public health, it will likely be considered a legitimate
governmental purpose. To pass this prong of the Central Hudson test, it
would be important for the government to identify a specific, cognizable
health concern stemming from consumption of not just fast food, but all
restaurant food.
Central Hudson's third prong provides another harsh challenge for
nutritional disclosure. If both of the previous questions are answered in the
affirmative, the court "must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted."1 27  This prong cannot be
satisfied by unproven theories or speculations. "A governmental body
seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and its restriction will in fact alleviate them
to a material degree."
1 28
The hardest hurdle for the government to jump will be to provide
convincing evidence that displaying the nutritional information of
restaurant foods will actually motivate consumers to make healthier food
choices than they would do without such information. The paramount
issue is whether requiring nutritional disclosure of food that people already
know is unhealthy changes eating habits. Eating excessive amounts of fast
food may lead to obesity.12 9 But, only 33 percent of Americans believe that
the fast food industry is at all responsible for the obesity epidemic.1 3' If the
people these bills are designed to help do not consider restaurants as
125. Id. at 74.
126. Id.
127. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1979).
128. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
129. Research has shown that "fast-food consumption has strong positive associations with
weight gain and insulin resistance, suggesting that fast food increases the risk of obesity and type
2 diabetes." Mark Pereira et al., Fast-Food Habits, Weight Gain, and Insulin Resistance (the
CARDIA Study): 15-year Prospective Analysis, 365 LANCET 36, 36 (2005).
130. Lydia Saad, Public Balks at Obesity Lawsuits, GALLUP POLL NEWS, Jul. 21, 2003,
http://www.gallup.com/pollI8869/Public-Balks-Obesity-Lawsuits.aspx (last visited Sept. 27,
2008).
[Vol. 36:1
FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
contributing to their health problems, will mandating nutritional disclosure
on restaurant menus actually improve both their health and food choices?
In enacting the failed New York regulations, New York City officials
claimed that calories were "the single most important piece of nutritional
information related to weight gain," and if citizens were informed as to the
caloric content of foods they purchased they would be "likely to decrease
caloric intake" and restaurants would offer food options with lower caloric
values.' 3 1 For the regulation to pass constitutional muster, the government
would have to prove that requiring restaurants to disclose nutritional
information about their meals directly promotes improved public health and
decreases obesity rates.
This obstacle will probably be difficult to overcome. It is at best
overly optimistic, and at worst naive to assume that consumers will change
their eating habits if they know the nutritional value of the food they put in
their bodies. Research shows that approximately 75 percent of Americans
are aware that fast food is unhealthy. 132 Other studies reveal that most fast
food patrons are unlikely to alter their eating behavior even if given
information on the nutritional content of meals. 133  Furthermore, even
people who are aware of calories often allow themselves to splurge at
restaurants, seeing restaurant dining as an event to be celebrated and not
restricted. 1
34
In addressing this third prong, courts have stressed the "direct"
prerequisite, stating that "conditional and remote eventualities" were not
considered acceptable justifications for restricting commercial speech. 1
35
Requiring disclosure of nutritional information is not constitutional
because it does not directly combat obesity. The science and research
backing nutrition disclosure is far from conclusive. 136  Making a person
131. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
132. Saad, supra note 130.
133. Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiency and Consumer Choice Theory in Nutritional
Labeling, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1161, 1175 (2004).
134. Kim Severson, New York Gets Ready to Count Calories, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at
F14, available at http://travel.nytimes.com/2006/12/13/dining/13calo.html?scp=l&sq=new%
20york%20gets%20ready/o20to%20count%20calories&st=cse.
135. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569
(1979).
136. Even though calorie disclosure requirements may seem like a health-promoting step,
where science and research is not yet robust, such a move may be premature. A Contrarian Take
on Trans Fats, NUTRITION PERSPECTIVES, (University of California, Davis Nutrition Department,
Davis, California), Mar.-Apr. 2007, at 6, available at http://nutrition.ucdavis.edu/
perspectives/Issues/2007/2NP%2OMarAprO7.pdf. Existing estimates of mortality rates caused by
obesity are largely inaccurate because they were "calculated by using a method likely to produce
biased estimates when the effects of obesity vary by age or other characteristics." Katherine M.
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aware of the calorie content of foods he or she consumes will not combat
his or her genetic predisposition to obesity. 137  Furthermore, studies show
that nationwide weight gain may not be solely caused by overeating, but
rather a result of human evolution.138 If increasing waistlines are a result of
biology, no amount of nutritional disclosure will change obesity rates.
Requiring nutrition disclosure at restaurants alone will not combat the
obesity epidemic because eating at restaurants is not causing obesity in our
society. 139 One study reported that the "[u]nintended consequences of our
contemporary, post-industrial society are deeply rooted cultural, social, and
economic factors that actively encourage overeating and sedentary
behavior and discourage alterations in these patterns .... ,,a If eating at
restaurants is not what is causing obesity in the United States, requiring
nutritional disclosure will not directly combat the government's stated
purpose.
Furthermore, menu disclosure will not directly combat obesity
because even if people are notified of the calories in what they eat they will
not likely consume fewer calories. Menu disclosure would fail to directly
combat obesity due to the various ways a food item's calories can be
manipulated by condiments and other variations. 14  Additionally, studies
Flegal et al., Methods of Calculating Deaths Attributable to Obesity, 160 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
331, 337 (2004).
137. Researchers have largely abandoned the overly simplistic approach that weight is solely
determined by excessive amounts of calories ingested exceeding calories burned. Kassirer &
Angell, supra note 1, at 53. Studies show that genetics play a significant role in determining a
person's weight and environment alone has no significant impact. See AJ Stunkard et al., An
Adoption Study of Human Obesity, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 193 (1986). See also AJ Stunkard et
al., A Twin Study of Human Obesity, 256 JAMA 51 (1986); R. Arlen Price & Irving 1. Gottesman,
Body Fat in Identical Twins Reared Apart: Roles for Genes and Environment, 21 BEHAVIOR
GENETICS 1 (1991).
138. One study noted that "the technological revolution of the 20th century has led to weight
gain becoming unavoidable for the majority of the population, because our bodies and biological
make-up are out of step with our surroundings." Jennifer Hill, Obesity a Result of Modern Life,
REUTERS, Oct. 17, 2004, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/healthNews/
idUSL1634028620071017. The study further commented that "[w]eight gain does not result
from people's actions-such as overindulgence or laziness-alone . I..." d
139. Multiple elements of modem living contribute to rising obesity rates and "only change
across many elements of our society will help us tackle obesity." Id.
140. See Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 26, at 18.
141. The choice of toppings placed on a hamburger can change the total calorie count up to
40 percent. Patrick Bashim & John Luik, Nutrition Labeling on Menu Boards and Menus: A
Recipe for Failure 2-3 (Wash. Legal Found. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 154, 2007),
available at http://www.data-yard.net/107/basham-luik-wp.pdf. Even under the proposed
legislation, calories of condiments such as mayonnaise, cheese, and ketchup would not likely be
included in the item's listing, but rather placed in a separate "condiment" section of the menu.
However, given that most consumers would not think to add calories for condiments they add to
their meals, they would most likely be misled into thinking their order was less caloric than it
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show that offering lower-calorie foods at fast food restaurants does not
necessarily lead to a reduction in total calories or obesity rates. 142 Even if
nutrition disclosure allows consumers to discern "healthy" menu items,
there will be no impact on obesity rates if consumers still choose to
overindulge in side dishes. Regulations that fail to decrease obesity fail the
third prong of Central Hudson and are unconstitutional.
Nutritional disclosures cannot combat obesity if the primary
consumers are unable to alter their choices. Most people who consume fast
food earn little money and have no option but to consume the least
expensive sources of calories possible.143 Because they cannot afford to eat
elsewhere, making nutritional content available will not prevent them from
eating high calorie food, and therefore, will not decrease obesity rates.
Lastly, nutrition disclosures at restaurants are not a sufficiently
effective obesity deterrent. America's growing waistline has been
attributed to a number of other causes besides food consumed at
restaurants.144 Schools are promoting obesity by providing children with
unhealthy foods in vending machines, creating policies that allow for
frequent snacking and providing fundraising and rewards revolving around
junk food. 14 5  Because obesity is caused by multiple factors, requiring
nutritional disclosure will not make a significant enough dent in the obesity
epidemic to justify the First Amendment violation it mandates.
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test will likely be the most
difficult for nutritional disclosure laws. This prong requires that the
regulation be no more extensive than necessary to serve the purported
truly was. Because the separation of condiments from the nutritional value of primary food items
will impair the consumer's ability to accurately judge the calorie content of their meals, forcing
disclosure will not achieve the government's stated goal of increasing nutrition knowledge and
combating obesity.
142. When consumers think main dishes are healthy, it leads them "to unknowingly choose
side dishes containing more calories and therefore enhance the chances of overeating because of
undetected increases in calorie intake." Pierre Chandon & Brian Wansink, The Biasing Health
Halos of Fast-Food Restaurant Health Claims: Lower Calorie Estimates and Higher Side-Dish
Consumption Intentions, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 301, 311 (2007).
143. See generally Jason P. Block et al., Fast Food, Race/Ethnicity, and Income: A
Geographic Analysis, 27 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 211 (2004).
144. Multiple unaddressed factors cause rising obesity rates, including soft drinks in schools,
marketing of unhealthy foods to children, and the lack of access to healthy foods in poor
communities. Nanci Hellmich, Restaurants as Obesity Cops Doesn't Sit Well, USA TODAY, Feb.
5, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2008-02-05-obesity-restaurant-
lawn.htm?loc=interstitialskip.
145. Martha Y. Kubik et al., Schoolwide Food Practices Are Associated With Body Mass
Index in Middle School Students, 159 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 1111,
1111- 14 (2005).
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governmental interest. 146 In order to be valid, a proponent must show that
the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech were "carefully
calculated."' 4 7 In order to fulfill this requirement, the proponents of the
nutritional disclosure laws will have to prove that the regulation is as
restrained as possible to achieve the promotion of public health.
In Central Hudson, the Court struck down the proposed regulation on
advertising electronic devices as more extensive than necessary, stating that
such a broad step was too extreme to justify the governmental purpose of
promoting energy conservation.1 48 The Court conceded the nobility and
viability of the state's interest of promoting energy conservation, calling it
an "imperative national goal.' ' 149 However, the Court ruled that absent a
showing that more limited speech regulation would be ineffective, the
complete suppression of Central Hudson's advertising could not be
approved.
50
Likewise, improving public health and reducing cost imposed on
states by obesity are also important national goals. There may be a serious
health epidemic sweeping our nation, and it may be the role of local and
statewide governments to implement change. In order to do so, however,
those governments will first have to show that more limited regulations
would be ineffective. Some scholars claim that mandatory menu labeling
is too far reaching because there are other less-imposing means of allowing
customers access to nutritional information about the food they are
eating.' 5' Legislators must recognize the mandate from the Court to take
into consideration the extreme financial burden accompanying nutrition
disclosure requirements on menus and menu boards. Research has shown
that "provid[ing] the nutritional analysis run[s] from $50 to $100 to analyze
an item for calories only, and between $220 and $650 for a full nutritional
analysis.... Altogether, these costs represent a substantial burden to the
affected chains."' 52 Another report suggests that printing costs for new
restaurant menus for an average chain restaurant would likely run at least
146. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1979).
147. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (citing Bd. of Trs. v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
148. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570.
149. Id. at 571.
150. Id.
151. Fribush, supra note 117, at 389.
152. Paul Bachman & David G. Tuerck, The Costs and Benefits of Implementing Proposed
Legislation to Curb Obesity in Maine, BHI Policy Study (Beacon Hill Inst. for Pub. Policy
Research), Mar. 2005, at 11.
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$25,000, and, due to promotional items and menu changes, this would
likely have to be done multiple times a year. 153
In response to these costs, which could likely prove insurmountable
for a number of restaurants, scholars suggest that, instead, restaurants
should only be required to make the information easily accessible through
readily available fliers and pamphlets.1 54  State and local health
organizations have supported such an approach, stating that the food
industry could aid in the battle against obesity by providing nutritional
information at the point of purchase. 55 This system would still promote
national health, but would be far less costly to restaurants.
56
Another effective alternative would be to require symbols identifying
healthful foods on menus. Restaurants could place an icon next to foods
which fell within certain "healthy" guidelines. Since any health or
nutrition claims made on menus are subject to FDA standards, the
parameters of such "healthy" foods would have to be within FDA
guidelines. Small symbols would not be as burdensome as nutritional
information because they would not take up as much space and would not
require extra research to determine multiple different types of nutritional
information. Symbols could be as inexpensive as stickers placed on a
menu. Placing symbols indicating healthy, low-fat foods would satisfy the
government's interest in increasing nutritional knowledge without placing
excessive burdens on the restaurant industry.
Nevertheless, governments attempting to implement regulations on
nutritional disclosure may have still have hope. In Central Hudson, the
Court left open a window of opportunity for states, stating that if states
could claim that their regulation was in response to an emergency situation,
an overly restrictive regulation might be found justifiable.'57  State
governments might claim that the obesity epidemic has become so all-
encompassing as to justify declaring an emergency situation for public
health. This option may be most viable in states where the cost of obesity
is particularly high, due to excessive obesity rates and a low percentage of
citizens with health insurance. 58 Studies show that being obese increases
153. Deborah Turcotte, Bill to Require Nutritional Data on Menus Killed, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 7, 2003, at B4.
154. Fribush, supra note 117, at 391.
155. NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR NUTRITION AND ACTIVITY, FROM WALLET TO WAISTLINE: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF SUPERSIZING 1 (June 2002), http://www.cspinet.org/w2w.pdf.
156. Id.
157. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 572
(1979).
158. Two such examples are West Virginia and Mississippi. According to the Center for
Disease Control, these states have two of the highest rates of obesity in the United States. CTR.
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an individual's annual medical expenses by 37 percent. 159  States and
taxpayers absorb much of the added medical expenses of obese patients
through Medicare and Medicaid.
160
Conclusion
The fact that something is not specifically prohibited should not
necessarily mean that it can be made mandatory just because it is found to
be in the "public interest."'161 Although mandating nutritional disclosure on
restaurant menus seems like a popular remedy for the so-called obesity
epidemic, it is paternalistic and constitutes an infringement of long-
protected First Amendment rights.
These regulations should be deemed unconstitutional under the
Central Hudson test. Menus declining to disclose nutrition information are
clearly lawful, non-misleading speech. 62 The interests purported by the
governments proposing such legislation are narrow (cost to local
government) and questionable (battling obesity). Nor is consumer curiosity
toward nutritional content of food a sufficient governmental interest to
justify infringement on First Amendment rights. The proponents of
disclosure legislation will have to narrow their interests to interests
promoted in passage of NLEA, public health, safety, and welfare in order
to pass the second Central Hudson prong. The nutritional disclosure
regulations are also unsuccessful in the third prong, failing to show that
they directly advance asserted governmental interests. Whether disclosing
nutritional information will actually alter or effect consumer eating habits
is uncertain. Science which is so disputed should not be allowed to dictate
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. OBESITY TRENDS 1985-2006, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/
obesity/trend/maps (last visited Sept. 27, 2008). These states also have particularly high
percentages of residents without health insurance. On average, between 2003 and 2005, 17.3
percent of Mississippians and 16.9 percent of West Virginians did not have health insurance.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURV., 2004 TO 2006 ANN. SOC. AND ECON.
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public policy at the expense of innocent businesses. 63  Furthermore,
because the cause of obesity is unsure, and most studies are plagued with
confounding factors, mandating nutritional disclosure at restaurants may
not combat obesity even if consumers do attempt to alter their eating habits
based on such information. Lastly, the disclosure regulations are
unconstitutional because they are not a narrowly tailored means of
achieving the proposed governmental interest. Having nutrition
information available to consumers through pamphlets at the counter or
identifying healthful menu items could achieve the same governmental
interest without imposing costly burdens on restaurants.
It has been said that "the crux of the current debate on obesity is how
to assign responsibility for the great harm it causes."' 64 Even if obesity
were to be addressed as a community problem, it would not be resolved by
requiring restaurants to put up caloric content on their menus and menu
boards. There are many other factors which cause obesity; and if these are
left unattended, obesity rates will continue to increase regardless of
whether restaurants put calories on their menus. Former Surgeon General
David Satcher illustrated the widespread causes of obesity as follows:
When there are no safe places for children to play, or for adults to
walk, jog, or ride a bike, that's a community responsibility. When
school lunchrooms or workplace cafeterias don't offer healthy and
appealing food choices, that is a community responsibility. When
new or expectant parents are not educated about the benefits of
breast-feeding, that's a community responsibility. And when we
don't require daily physical education in our schools, that is also a
community responsibility. 
165
It is time for our society to take community responsibility for the so-
called obesity epidemic we have created instead of denying rights to the
latest scapegoat for our bodily dissatisfaction: restaurants and fast-food
establishments.
163. Dr. David B. Allison, President of the Obesity Society, has suggested that proposed
nutritional disclosure regulations would actually harm more than help, "by adding to the
forbidden-fruit allure of high-calorie foods or by sending patrons away hungry enough that they
will later gorge themselves even more." Saul, supra note 51.
164. Samuel J. Romero, Comment, Obesity Liability: A Super-sized Problem or a Small Fry
in the Inevitable Development of Product Liability?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 239, 241 (2004).
165. Press Release, Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
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8, 2001), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/news/pressreleases/probesity.pdf.
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